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Rand's Metaethics: Reply to Objectivist Critics
by Ari Armstrong, Copyright © 2018, 2025
; ported here June 7, 2025
This material originally was published in three parts dating November 19, 25, and 27, 2018.
How Objectivists Can Fruitfully Reply to My Critique of Rand's Ethics
November 19, 2018
I have come to believe that Ayn Rand's Objectivist ethics is basically wrong, however interesting and insightful it is in various ways. Because of my interest in the matter, and because I used to think that Rand's theory is correct, I spent considerable effort reading about the theory and formulating my thoughts about it. I wrote up the results in my new book, What's Wrong with Ayn Rand's Objectivist Ethics (see also the landing page).
I have followed Objectivist circles long enough to anticipate that my book probably will generate heated comments from some Objectivists. That's fine, of course; part of the purpose of the book is to provoke discourse. But that discourse can follow either helpful or unhelpful paths; here my goal is to promote the former.
People who already think that Rand's moral theory is wrong, and people looking to learn about Rand's views, also can find my book helpful. Here I primarily address Objectivist readers.
I sincerely hope that Objectivists will make a strong effort to defeat the arguments I make in the book. Since beginning the project, I have thought that, if Objectivists can effectively rebut my points, then Rand's theory is definitely true. In other words, I make what I think is the strongest possible case against Rand's theory, and, if my case fails, I don't see how any other case could succeed. (Of course at various points I invoke and develop arguments raised by others, going back to the 1960s. And, as I explain in the book, I join Objectivists in rejecting the sort of intrinsicism of philosophers such as G. E. Moore, so those who think that I'm wrong about that will think that I do not make the most important sorts of criticisms.)
I encourage Objectivists to stay focused on the essential issue: Is Rand's metaethics true or false? The pivotal chapter in the book, "The Essential Fallacies of Rand's Ethics," is also the shortest. Objectivists who criticize the rest of the book, yet ignore that chapter, will have missed the point. To defend Rand's theory, Objectivists need to explain how and why Rand's basic metaethical arguments hold up. They cannot merely argue around the edges of the theory, as though volume of commentary could substitute for establishing the essential point.
I raise this issue because, by page count, much of my book is devoted to implications of the theory. I see this material as supplemental yet important to my main case. I offer an avalanche of evidence that I think adds up to a very powerful case.
I acknowledge that various points that I make are not definitive arguments. They are instead plausibility claims. Rand's theory just cannot plausibly explain many normal human values, I argue. Examples include having and raising children, pursuing various pleasures, rationally committing suicide (say to prevent great suffering), respecting others' rights in important contexts, avoiding free riding (again in important contexts), and engaging civically. It is the weight of evidence that I find compelling as supplemental to the main case.
Yet my basic case against the metaethics does not depend on me being right about all of the implications. Even if Objectivists could effectively rebut some of my plausibility arguments (which I don't think they can), that would not defeat the overall case. I say again: The metaethics must be tackled head-on.
I hope that Objectivists will reserve final judgment of my book until they read the final chapter. There, I formulate a person's ultimate end differently than Rand does, yet, as will be obvious, my approach remains close in important respects to what Rand offers. I see Rand's approach and my own as within the broadly Aristotelian tradition; they are theoretical cousins. Indeed, as I argue, Rand in some of her earlier work and various Objectivists in their mature work follow a path similar to what I lay out. Operationally, I think many Objectivists already implicitly embrace the moral theory that I outline in my final chapter.
Objectivists can value my book, although it is basically critical of Objectivism, for three main reasons (other than the primary reason that I make a strong case).
First, I give Rand a full and respectful hearing. My entire first chapter is a (mostly) sympathetic treatment of Rand and her conception of selfishness. I read Rand's main works carefully, and I also read "the literature" about her moral theory. (Tracking down various, now-obscure essay from the 1970s was a chore.) Readers might quibble with how I interpret various remarks by Rand and others—I will be happy to respond to such criticisms—but I think no one can rationally deny that I make a full and sincere effort to present Rand's theory accurately and in context.
Indeed, if I stripped my critical commentary from the book and lightly edited the rest, the result would be a pretty good introduction to Rand's moral theory.
Second, at some points I offer comments on Rand's theory that probably will be helpful to its advocates, as with my section about the choice to live. And many Objectivists will find my appendix, in which I briefly go through major works on Rand's ethics, to be helpful.
Third, my book opens up some good opportunities for Objectivists to explain and defend Rand's moral theory. I'll outline three examples.
a) I argue that Objectivists have a hard time squaring parenthood with the Objectivist ethics. Parenthood is basically other-oriented, while Objectivism is basically self-oriented. Although many Objectivists are parents or are involved in the education of children, Objectivists have written surprisingly little about parenthood as it relates to the metaethics.
b) I argue that the Objectivist theory of rights runs into trouble in the context of the institutionalization of force. I frame the issue in a distinctive way and review the most important arguments, pro and con.
c) I do the best I can to recreate the Objectivist case against free riding, but Objectivists have written very little on the topic. When they have written on it, sometimes they have misunderstood the essential issues at stake.
Consider my book, in part, an open invitation for Objectivists to further address these topics and others.
Some people, I recognize, will argue that I fundamentally misunderstand Rand's metaethical theory.
To summarize the theory, as I understand it: Values, Rand holds, orient to an organism's survival. For people, who have choice, values should orient to a person's survival. Yes, yes: I am well aware that Rand is after robust, long-term survival; that, as Rand holds, people survive in particular ways; that, for Rand, such survival requires virtue and results in happiness; and that "survival at any price" is not Rand's standard. I review such matters in detail in the book. Still, the issue of life as opposed to death is central to Rand's approach.
Two main groups will question my interpretation of Rand's metaethics.
The first group, including scholars such as Chris Matthew Sciabarra and Neera Badhwar, argue that Rand's metaethics is not "survivalist" in orientation because (to simplify) Rand's conception of "life" is sufficiently rich that survival does not capture what she is after, and many values that Rand embraces do not fit a survivalist framework. But, as I discuss at length in the book, Rand's metaethics is survivalist in the relevant sense as Rand presents it. My goal is to read Rand straight and assume that she meant what she said. Whether Rand's metaethics implies what she thinks it implies is a different question; I maintain that, in important ways, it does not.
The second group includes Objectivists who, in effect, so expand their conception of "life" that their theory cannot sensibly be described as survivalist. The problem with this approach is that it is ultimately self-contradictory. The position is essentially this: "People should act to sustain their survival as the sort of beings that they are; and they are the sort of beings that sometimes pursue values that do not sustain their survival." At that point the theory is not even coherent. Rand's actual theory at least is coherent, and we pay Rand a compliment by recognizing as much.
It might be helpful here to mention a couple of key developments in my thinking on the general topic. The first was my understanding of basic evolutionary biology as articulated by scientists such as Richard Dawkins. As I argue in a chapter in my book, Rand's biological claims just don't hold up—and those claims are relevant to her metaethics. The second was my thinking about values as children pursue them, when they first start to think abstractly. Children soon realize (implicitly at first) that they have to make trade-offs among their values, that they sometimes have to accept some pain now (as with a vaccination shot) for future benefit, and that they sometimes have to defer gratification for future gains. Such was the seed for my final chapter.
I close on a note about social implications. Many of my friends and friendly associates I have met through a shared interest in Ayn Rand. It is awkward, then, to criticize fundamental ideas embraced by so many people whom I admire and respect.
Yet I cannot profess to believe ideas that I no longer believe. As I wrote last year, I no longer count myself an Objectivist—because Objectivism is a particular philosophy that I no longer accept in important fundamentals. As I wrote then and as I believe now, I see myself as a "fellow traveler" with Objectivists on many important matters.
The essence of Objectivism is that people should seek to independently understand reality based on their observations of reality and their logical thinking about those observations. Objectivists may conclude that my book is wrong in key ways. But I think they will understand that I did the best I could to make rational sense of the issues at hand and that I cannot pretend to think other than I do out of a worry about social awkwardness.
If Objectivism could be distilled to three words, they would be these: Think for yourself. That I am seeking to do so, I think, is the ultimate compliment that I could pay to Ayn Rand—even if I am wrong.
And if I am wrong, then Objectivists will be able to demonstrate why I am wrong. They have their work cut out for them. I look forward to further defending my case.
Reply to Pseudo-Objectivists
November 25, 2018
Objectivists I know and know of tend to be smart, thoughtful, balanced, joyful, successful people. They do profoundly important work in such areas as education, technology, aviation, business, law, and philosophy. In many ways their productive achievements directly or indirectly benefit my life.
Unfortunately, there is a brand of self-proclaimed Objectivist—more accurately, pseudo-Objectivist—who tends to parrot Ayn Rand's ideas rather than seek to deeply understand them and to nastily smear both Objectivists whom they deem heretical and critics of Rand's ideas. These pseudo-Objectivists tend to feed off of each others' social media outrage. A friend of mine found herself the target of such attacks over months of online harassment.
To most of the world, these pseudo-Objectivists are invisible, as they isolate themselves in their tiny and mostly-irrelevant echo-chambers. To the extent that they make themselves visible—and they certainly try—they undermine the positive cultural work of actual Objectivists.
As I prepared to publish my critique of Rand's ethics, I warily anticipated the reaction of these pseudo-Objectivists. Sure enough, they went on the attack, living down to the worst stereotypes of the enraged, dogmatic "Objectivist."
One such fellow declared on social media, referring to my book: "An entire book entitled 'What's wrong with Rand's Ethics' is preposterous and automatically invalid on the face of it." So, of course, he can reject the book without the bother of reading it or grappling with any of its arguments. He and another fellow seriously discussed whether I am an "intellectual psychopath" for having published the book. Yet another person accused me of advocating "biological determinism," even though I explicitly criticize such in the book (which he refuses to read). Such attacks are pure anti-intellectualism.
Of course, I do expect serious Objectivists to take issue with my book and to offer real arguments against my position. Such is the nature of intellectual discourse.
Unfortunately, the cranks tend to run laps before the serious critics get their shoes tied. If the crankery were restricted to social media, I'd be tempted to ignore it. Unfortunately, it has spilled out visibly onto the Amazon page for my book. The first review posted—the day after I formally announced the book—is intended, not as a serious review of the book, but as a smear to suppress sales.
Because mine is a niche book with a relatively small potential audience, cranks quickly can torpedo the ratings. I replied to the review in a comment, but, unfortunately, Amazon hides replies, making them difficult for potential readers to find.
I reproduce my reply here. Quotes are taken from the "review," which readers can find at Amazon if they wish.
Ari Armstrong here, the author: Potential readers may note that the anonymous "review" to which I respond does not actually have any substantive content. Instead, it name-calls and makes some misleading or evidence-free assertions.
Unfortunately, with Amazon reviews of niche books, such as mine, a few cranks quickly can weight the average.
I'll leave aside the reviewer's obvious name-calling and respond to the claims at hand.
Does my work "focus on narrow points of philosophy"? Well, it is a book about philosophy, specifically about Ayn Rand's Objectivist ethics. So I discuss that general theory as well as "narrow" aspects of it. Would the reviewer prefer a book on Rand's moral theory that does not discuss its details?
My first chapter (which people can read for free via Amazon's "look inside" feature for the Kindle edition) is not just about Rand's philosophy; rather, I seek to offer important context about Rand's life as well as about her views on rational selfishness.
My second chapter, "Reviewing the Objectivist Ethics," outlines the metaethical theory that Rand lays out, drawing especially from Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics" (which people can read for free through the Ayn Rand Institute). My third chapter focuses on the broad problems with Rand's metaethics. My fourth chapter focuses on the problems with Rand's biology as they pertain to her metaethics. So those chapters address Rand's moral theory generally.
True, my fifth through eighth chapters focus on narrower aspects of Rand's theory, such as Rand's hypothetical example of the "indestructible robot" (which she believes buttresses her case) and Rand's theory of rights. A book such as this would have been incomplete without such discussions.
Do I typically "review . . . Rand's philosophy" only to "decide in a paragraph at the end that there's something fundamentally flawed" with it? No—although I do make a concerted effort to "steel-man" Rand's case by presenting it fully. I do not merely "decide" that Rand's theory is wrong at various points; rather, I spend a great deal of space crafting detailed arguments as to why it is wrong. People may disagree with my arguments, but to pretend that I have no arguments is unfair.
It is true that I base part of my case on plausibility claims. For example, I do not believe that Rand's survival-oriented metaethics can (as she believes) plausibly account for why people normally become parents; why people may commit suicide to end great suffering; or why we should consistently respect others' rights even under a system of institutional force. In those cases, ultimately I ask the reader to judge whether Rand's case is plausible, based on the evidence presented. But such plausibility claims are supplementary to my main arguments and should be treated as such.
Do I "equivocate" "between the terms 'life' and 'survival'"? No, I do the opposite: I carefully define the role that Rand's conception of life plays in her moral theory. As I point out, the issue of life versus death, of life in terms of survival, is central to Rand's approach, as she explicitly says. So I do discuss the relationship between life and survival at length, both in terms of how Rand handles that relationship and in terms of how I think it should be handled. Pointing out that the term "life" can have distinctive meanings, depending on context, is the opposite of equivocation and the cure for it.
Our anonymous reviewer claims that I use "expensive words where ordinary ones will work" and that my book is "full of gross stylistic excesses." That is silly name-calling—notice that the reviewer does not offer any examples of this. True, I do of necessity use (and define) certain technical terms, such as "metaethics" and "intrinsicism," terms common to the subject. I hardly could have discussed Rand's critique of intrinsicism without using the term.
A also review some technical debates about Rand's theory that have taken place largely in academic journals. At the same time, I do the best job that I think can be done to make those academic debates accessible to the non-specialist and to those new to Rand's philosophy. (I offer extensive footnotes and a lengthy appendix geared more to specialists.)
I readily concede that anyone looking for a puff piece on Rand has come to the wrong place.
Of course people should not begin with my book if they wish to understand philosophy or ethics generally; such is not the aim of my book. Nor is my book a "criticism of Ayn Rand" generally; I do not address Rand's general theories of metaphysics and epistemology, for example (although I touch on those matters as they pertain to the ethics).
This book is what it claims to be: A well-developed criticism of Rand's moral theory, in all its richness.
Another person posted a comment suggesting that Objectivists need not consider my book because other critics of Rand have produced "misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Rand's ideas." He adds that I should make my book available for free if I want Objectivists to read it.
I replied:
People have no obligation to read my book, of course. But people who are intellectually honest and objective in their approach will not pretend to have the competence to judge a book that they refuse to read.
As for your suggestion that someone who pours thousands of hours into a book ought to work for free, such is comical coming from someone professing an interest in Rand's ideas. Surely you are aware that Rand endorses capitalism and the earning of profits. (If you are not aware of this, I offer an overview of Rand's views of capitalism in my first chapter, which you could read for free via Kindle's "look inside" feature, if you were interested in serious discussion rather than just trolling me.)
Of course Rand did sell newsletter subscriptions and books while she was alive. Now, decades after the publication of her essay, "The Objectivist Ethics," the Ayn Rand Institute publishes it for free online, as part of its overall mission to promote Rand's ideas.
I am not responsible for the misrepresentations of others, and no actual Objectivist would suggest otherwise. (Unfortunately, pseudo-Objectivist cranks tend to be much more vocal than actual Objectivists.) I myself discuss various misrepresentations of Rand's theory in my first chapter as well as in my appendix.
My first chapter is available for free, I have written an extensive reply to a previous comment here, I have published a new essay introducing my book [above], and I have written extensively about Rand on my own web site as well as at The Objective Standard (where you can find my articles, if you like). I will continue to write about the book, responses to it, and Rand's theory at my web site.
Of course, some people will argue (by which I mean, actually present arguments) that I misunderstand Rand in important ways and that I do not properly interpret her theory. They are welcome to argue as much, and I will be happy to defend my position. Such is the nature of intellectual discourse.
Finally, I do not claim that my book entirely offers "a unique groundbreaking refutation" of Rand's moral theory. Rather, as I openly say, and as my hundreds of citations attest, often I present and develop arguments first presented by others, going back to the 1960s. I do frame certain arguments in a distinctive way, and I do think my critique is the most comprehensive and well-developed one in offer.
I will reply to additional crankery here, as needed. And hopefully at some point actual Objectivists will publish some serious criticisms of the book, at which point I will be happy to engage in a substantive discussion.
Rand's Ethics and the Burden of Proof
November 27, 2018
I want to encourage Objectivists to bear in mind who has the burden of proof regarding Rand's moral theory. Objectivists have the burden to prove both that the metaethics is valid and that it entails the sorts of values and actions that they say it does.
In my new book, What's Wrong with Ayn Rand's Objectivist Ethics, I present two chapters ("The Essential Fallacies of Rand's Ethics" and "The Error in Rand's Biology") that, in my view, definitively disprove Rand's metaethics. To successfully defend Rand's theory, Objectivists need to show, if they can, where my arguments go wrong and how Rand's arguments succeed.
Much of the rest of my book argues that Objectivists cannot square their metaethics with various values that they embrace. To give some examples, I argue that Rand's survival-oriented metaethics cannot account for why people normally become parents (when they do), why they might commit suicide to prevent horrible suffering, why they should respect others' rights even in certain cases of institutional force, and why they should avoid free riding in important cases.
In these cases, I offer strong reasons, but not definitive proofs, to doubt that Rand's metaethics works out the way that Objectivists think it does. But the burden does not rest with me to prove that Rand's theory does not work as Objectivists say; the burden rests with Objectivists to prove that it does. I do all that I need to do and all that I think can be done in these cases: Offer strong reasons to doubt the Objectivist case.
I hope that Objectivists will pay attention to what I am actually arguing. I am arguing that Rand's metaethics cannot account for various values that Objectivists often embrace. If I'm right, then this independently serves to reduce Rand's theory to absurdity, because a metaethics that cannot plausibly account for many normal human values just doesn't work.
I am not arguing that Rand or Objectivists cannot or do not embrace the values in question. They often can and do. So bringing up how many Objectivists are parents, or what Objectivists have written about parenthood and education generally (for example), does not address the question at hand. I think that Objectivists typically embrace all sorts of values that are incompatible with their formal metaethics. So the question is not whether Objectivists embrace those values, but whether they can square those values with their metaethical theory.
I hasten to point out that, even if Objectivists could plausibly explain how their metaethics accounts for some or all of the values under discussion, that still would not rebut the arguments in my third and fourth chapters (the ones mentioned above), which directly address Rand's core metaethical theory.
To repeat: The burden of proof rests with Objectivists to prove that their metaethics is valid and that it entails the values they say it does. I welcome a serious effort by Objectivists to assume that burden in light of the challenges I raise.
For more see the landing page for What's Wrong with Ayn Rand's Objectivist Ethics.