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What's Wrong with Ayn Rand's Objectivist Ethics—Landing Page
by Ari Armstrong, Copyright © 2025
; last updated June 8, 2025
An earlier version of this page was published on December 12, 2018.
Here I collect my essays and other resources about my 2018 book, What's Wrong with Ayn Rand's Objectivist Ethics. I placed the entire book online on June 7; please note that the contents remain copyrighted and may be not reproduced without my express, written permission. You also may purchase the paperback or ebook (via Amazon).
Introduction
My thesis is that Ayn Rand's survival-oriented metaethics is wrong. Rand's case is flawed logically and inconsistent with basic facts of biology. Further, Rand's metaethics does not square with all of the values that Rand embraces nor with all of the values that people normally embrace. My alternate view is that people experience certain things as ends in themselves (or, valuable for their own sake), and the point of ethics is to help us integrate our values.
My main focus is on Rand's 1961 paper, "The Objectivist Ethics" (published in 1964 in The Virtue of Selfishness), although of course I also discuss numerous other works by Rand, by Rand's supporters, and by her critics. In "The Objectivist Ethics," Rand argues that values normally orient to life in terms of survival and that the concept of value must (rationally) be understood in light of that relationship. People, who have choice, should choose to so orient their values. More precisely, Rand argues that people should pursue their robust, long-term survival, which they can achieve only by acting virtuously (with reason as the crown virtue), and which pursuit normally results in happiness.
My interpretation of "The Objectivist Ethics" is controversial in some quarters, but my goal is to read Rand's essay straight and to assume that Rand meant what she said. I proceed on the assumption that the Objectivist ethics is what Rand says that it is in the essay that she titles, "The Objectivist Ethics."
True, Rand developed her formal metaethics relatively late in her thinking, and by that point she already had developed a rich (if incomplete) moral theory. Rand's main defenders argue that Rand's formal metaethics fits perfectly with her previous thinking and completes her moral theory. My view is that Rand's metaethics is an errant attempt to integrate her previous thinking and that her metaethics is at odds with some of her moral commitments. (Others seem to think that Rand's metaethics is something other than what she says it is.)
At the heart of the book are my (relatively short) second and third chapters, "Reviewing the Objectivist Ethics" and "The Essential Fallacies of Rand's Ethics."
My fourth chapter is titled, "The Error in Rand's Biology," and I want to dispel some potential misunderstandings about that. The chapter shows that Rand's survival-oriented metaethics is inconsistent with basic biology. What I am not doing here, and what I explicitly point out that I am not doing (despite some baseless criticisms to the contrary), is arguing that people are somehow biologically determined or that people should somehow pursue their "genetic fitness" or the like. The point of this chapter is to show that Rand's arguments about the nature of values fail. Elsewhere, particularly in my final chapter, I present my own views on ethics.
In much of the rest of the book, I show that Rand's survival-oriented metaethics does not square with various normal human values. In various sections I further explain and critique aspects of Rand's theory, such as her example of an "indestructible robot" and her standard of "survival qua man."
In my seventh chapter, "Egoism and Rights," I argue that Rand offers strong reasons for a survival-oriented egoist to respect others' rights in the context of a generally rights-respecting society, but that her theory breaks down in the context of institutional force. In my eighth chapter, I argue that Rand's theory has trouble handling the free-rider problem and important cases of charity.
In my final chapter, "Rethinking the Ultimate Value," I indicate an alternate way to conceive of a person's ultimate value, one that fits snugly with our nature as rational beings and with normal human values. I suggest that Rand follows a path similar to what I lay out before veering off course.
Some readers will be interested in my extensive notes and in my lengthy appendix, which briefly goes through major works (and some minor ones) dealing with Rand's ethics.
Questions and Answers
Question: In "The Objectivist Ethics," does Rand really endorse a "survivalist" or survival-oriented metaphysics?
Answer: Yes, she really does. She describes "an organism's life" as its "ultimate value" and its "final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means." She makes clear that she means "life" as opposed to death, something that is "self-sustaining."
My interpretation is the standard one among Objectivist philosophers. Leonard Peikoff writes in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, "Objectivism says that remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action" (p. 213). Tara Smith writes in Viable Values that things are of value "only because of their impact on an individual's life—on his survival and on the subordinate goals that sustain his survival. . . . [L]ife is the goal and sets the proper standard of value" (p. 93). Allan Gotthelf with Gregory Salmieri write in A Companion to Ayn Rand, "The structure of Rand's argument makes it clear that she intended the standard of value to include only content that could be derived from the requirements of man's literal survival" (p. 79).
I do think that Rand's implicit metaethics sometimes is at odds with her formal, explicit mataethics, as I explore in the final chapter of my book.
Question: Do you wrongly presume that Rand endorses brute survival or survival at any price?
Answer: No, of course not; that would be silly. Rather, I point out that Rand holds that we as people should survive the only way that we ultimately can, as rational beings, according to rational principles. I further point out that Rand sees happiness as the normal consequence of acting rationally.
Question: You use some examples of animals acting for offspring or relatives, rather than for their own survival. Doesn't this ignore the critical importance of volition in human life?
Answer: No, I recognize the importance of volition. This concern just misses the point of the examples, which is to show that Rand's claims about biology are wrong. Specifically, Rand claims that living things (aside from humans who may choose otherwise) normally always act for their self-sustenance. Rand also says, "On the physical level, the functions of all living organisms . . . are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism's life."
Why is this important? Rand's claims about biology provide the basis for her claims about the logical relationship between values and life. Without the biological basis, her metaethics falls apart. Rand is correct that "it is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil," but she is incorrect that all of a living thing's actions do or should orient to its life in terms of its self-sustenance or survival.
Obviously humans have the power to substantially choose their values and to act according to moral principles. I never claim or imply otherwise.
Question: Then are you assuming that people should pursue their reproductive fitness?
Answer: No, obviously not; that would be silly. My purpose in raising the issue of reproductive fitness is just to show that Rand is on the wrong track, not to try to establish a different moral theory. I do think that our biology is relevant to ethics, but in a complex and subtle way in the context of our rational integration of values. We should avoid the naturalistic fallacy.
Question: Do you use exotic examples from biology that aren't relevant to normal life?
Answer: No. I do use some exotic examples for emphasis (for example, the "mother-eating" spider), but I also use normal, everyday examples such as having and raising children and expending energy on mating.
Question: Are you an "intellectual psychopath"? Do you fancy yourself a "transformational genius"? Did you "plagiarize" Ayn Rand's work?
Answer: Come on now. These are all allegations from people who claim to be Objectivists or at least fans of Rand's work. My advice to self-proclaimed Objectivists here is to not live down to the worst stereotypes of Objectivists. A serious person, a person who takes objectivity seriously, responds to arguments fairly and with more arguments and does not descend to distortions and public smears. I regard my alternate metaethics of value integration as a close Aristotelian cousin of Rand's theory and one deeply informed by Rand's works. And I cite Rand and many others exhaustively.
Reviews and Media
Jason Brennan, a heavy-hitter libertarian philosopher and author of the books When All Else Fails and Against Democracy (among others), posts a review at Bleeding Heart Libertarians (December 11, 2018). He writes: "An engaging discussion and critique of Rand's metaethics and ethics. . . . I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in Rand." I would tweak a line; Rand thinks that "only living things seem to pursue value," as Brennan says (and I agree with Rand here), but Rand also thinks that it is demonstrably true that living things normally pursue values for the ultimate aim of sustaining their lives (which is false, as Brennan and I agree). Rand further thinks that people should pursue values for that aim.
Jon Caldara, host of the Devil's Advocate television show, hosted a brief discussion about my book and about Rand's cultural influence (video posted to YouTube December 11, 2018). The time here is very limited, so I could make only a few basic points.
Andreas Müller wrote up a series of essays (in German) favorably discussing my book. His related articles are dated November 30, December 1, December 3, and December 19 (all 2018). A nit: Although children do not play a major role in Rand's fiction, they do appear (as I mention in the book).
Eyal Mozes writes in his review (January 6, 2019): "Objectivists have become jaded with critiques of Objectivism that attack ridiculous straw men, with no attempt to understand what Rand actually said; and who throw out any argument they can think of, no matter how obviously fallacious, in the hope that something sticks. Armstrong's book is a refreshing exception. Armstrong has read Rand's writings, and the literature discussing her ethics, with close attention, and for the most part presents Rand’s philosophy accurately, more so than many of those who claim to defend it. He devotes a lot of time to explaining Rand's ideas and arguments, correcting common misconceptions about them, and discussing and ably answering many of the weak criticisms of Objectivism that have appeared in the literature, before presenting his own criticisms. The result is a very interesting and thought-provoking book, which, if it gets the attention it deserves, will be an important contribution to the literature on Objectivism." (See below for links to subsequent exchanges between Mozes and me.)
Liberty On the Rocks, Flatirons, hosted my talk on the book on January 14, 2019.
Additional Essays
Rand's Metaethics: Reply to Objectivist Critics
November 27, 2018
I am well aware that Rand is after robust, long-term survival; that, as Rand holds, people survive in particular ways; that, for Rand, such survival requires virtue and results in happiness; and that "survival at any price" is not Rand's standard. . . . The burden of proof rests with Objectivists to prove that their metaethics is valid and that it entails the values they say it does.
Rand's Ethics: Reply to Dave Walden
November 28, 2018
Rand's theory is that, for all living things, values normally orient to an organism's survival. For people, who have choice, this implies that people should act ultimately for their (robust, long term) survival (which results in happiness and which they can achieve only by practicing reason and the related virtues). . . . Rand is wrong about why organisms other than humans generally pursue values, and she is wrong about why people ultimately should pursue values.
Rand's Ethics: Reply to David W. Johnson
February 1, 2019
That Rand presents a survival-oriented metaethics—with all that she thinks that entails for human beings—is not in question by anyone who takes Rand's philosophy seriously. Johnson either misrepresents my claims or else pretends that I do not account for aspects of Rand's theory that I do account for.
A Reply to Mozes on Rand's Ethics
May 3, 2019
Eyal Mozes and I agree very closely on the proper interpretation of Ayn Rand's metaethical theory. We disagree about whether that theory is correct (I say no) and what the theory entails in terms of certain moral commitments. More
Rand's Metaethics: A Reply to Don Watkins's Nonobjective Review
September 9, 2019
Don Watkins ignores almost all of the substance of my book, grossly distorts what he does address, and descends into juvenile name-calling. More
Errata
On page 46, line 11, "dependent" should be "depend."
On p. 112, n. 155, I used the story of Johnny Bobbitt as someone who "contribute[s] to the welfare of others." More recently he was "accused of conspiring to deceive donors in a fraudulent crowdfunding scheme." Thankfully this detail does not affect my broader point (and I use a second example here anyway). Another example of a homeless person helping others is when, on April 25, 2019, Darin Barton helped people escape a horrific and fiery auto crash near Denver.
On p. 186, third line of second full paragraph, "district" should be "distinct."
(These issues have been fixed in the online version of the book.)