'A Drug-Using Atheist'

Christian columnist and professor Mike Adams recently admitted past drug use and commented on Obama's past drug use:

In addition to smoking marijuana -- sometimes laced with substances like PCP -- for a number of years, I also experimented with drugs like hashish, powdered cocaine, LSD, and methamphetamines (including ecstasy). I regret my decision to use illegal drugs in my youth and I'm really sorry. Now that my past drug use is out of the way, let's move on to Barack Obama.

I may surprise a number of people by saying that I don't think Obama's past drug use -- including the use of powdered cocaine -- in any way disqualifies him from being President. I know I've had no trouble refraining from illegal drug use since I joined a Christian church many years ago.

I had not heard about Obama's drug use, but an article from the Washington Post confirms it:

Long before the national media spotlight began to shine on every twist and turn of his life's journey, Barack Obama had this to say about himself [in Dreams From My Father]: "Junkie. Pothead. That's where I'd been headed: the final, fatal role of the young would-be black man. . . . I got high [to] push questions of who I was out of my mind." ... Through his book, Obama has become the first potential presidential contender to admit trying cocaine.

I agree with Adams that Obama's past drug use does not disqualify him for the presidency (and Republicans can hardly argue the point, given the man they put into office). However, Adams suggests that the reason we can trust Obama not to return to drug use is that he converted to Christianity -- which is ridiculous. Many Christians abuse drugs, including alcohol, while many atheists do not. What's important is for somebody to build a better moral character. I personally know people who, in that process, became religious, but that's because they saw religion as the only alternative to the moral subjectivism that had troubled them. I also personally know people who, as they overcame drug abuse, either remained atheists or moved away from religion and toward a secular morality. (I particularly recommend Craig Biddle's Loving Life and Tara Smith's Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics for their discussions of rational virtues.)

I started out as a Christian; then I became an atheist who abused drugs (particularly alcohol, but a few times other drugs). Finally I grew up, took a hard look at my past mistakes, and started to work hard to improve my character. (I'm still working out a few details.)

I know I've had no trouble refraining from drug abuse since I rejected first the Christian church and then a pragmatic subjectivism many years ago.

Aristotle on Intellectual Ambitiousness

Recently I acquired the two-volume Complete Works of Aristotle (order from Amazon), which promises many hours of illuminating reading. The first book I started to look through is Metaphysics, in which Aristotle argues that no knowledge is properly beyond man. He writes of the subject at hand (Book I (A) 2, or page 1555):

Hence the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides 'God alone can have this privilege', and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (indeed, according to the proverb, 'bards tell many a lie'), nor should any science be thought more honourable than one of this sort.

So, while Aristotle comfortably refers to God, Aristotle is careful not to place any knowledge beyond the reach of man. This approach is the exact opposite of that of, say, Saint Augustine (and of many modern evangelicals).

Aristotle adds that metaphysics "would be most meet for God to have... for God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle..." What Aristotle means by this "first principle," and why he finds it necessary, is one of the main points that I hope to learn from the volumes.

Rand on God

Ayn Rand has many things to say about religion. However, I found one of her comments in a place I didn't expect: the lengthy appendix to Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (order from Amazon.) Somebody asks her about the conceptual status of "God." She replies:

["God"] is not a concept. At best, one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character. It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality -- such as omnipotence and omniscience.

Besides, God isn't even supposed to be a concept: he is sui generis, so that nothing relevant to man or the rest of nature is supposed, by the proponents of that viewpoint, to apply to God. A concept has to involve two or more similar concretes, and there is nothing like God. He is supposed to be unique. Therefore, by their own terms of setting up the problem, they have taken God out of the conceptual realm. And quite properly, because he is out of reality. (page 148)

Incidentally, I also found the material between pages 150 and 157 to contain a number of interesting comments about volition and the distinction between mind and matter.

Peikoff's Sixth Podcast

Yesterday Leonard Peikoff released his sixth podcast, in which he answers questions about Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand. This time, he took on four main questions. (Again, my summaries are no substitute for the content of Peikoff's comments.)

1. Should one hesitate to become a writer of fiction, if one believes that one could never match the quality of Rand's novels? Peikoff answers that relying on such a "comparative standard" is a "complete error." Instead, if you love the work of some particular field, and if you can produce work of value in that field, you should go for it.

2. Would an isolationist foreign policy with respect to the Middle East make us safer? Peikoff notes that political isolation can work only between regions that are both non-aggressive. Once one side initiates aggression, isolationism is unworkable. Peikoff adds that, in the case of Islamic terrorists, the notion that a United States military presence in the Middle East somehow provoked the attacks is a only a rationalization; the real motive of Islamic terrorists is "hatred of the West."

3. Can one act without an emotional impetus? Peikoff believes not. Every act must be motivated by some "value commitment."

4. Are internet discussions about Objectivism fruitful? Peikoff answers that, while they can be, often they lack philosophical context and rigor. Speaking from my own experience, I look back with embarrassment on much that I wrote "about" Objectivism years ago when I knew very little about it; much of what I wrote was complete nonsense. Readers unfamiliar with Objectivism, then, should bear in mind that many internet forums may radically misrepresent Ayn Rand's ideas, and this can be true of comments coming from detractors as well as (nominal) supporters of those ideas.

I'm really enjoying these podcasts, and I hope that my brief summaries help to point others to them.

Peikoff's Fifth Podcast

Leonard Peikoff's podcasts are interesting enough that I want to alert my readers to new installments. Peikoff published his fifth podcast on December 23. Most of his comments relate to politics.

The first question may seem obscure to people unfamiliar with debates within Objectivism (the philosophy of Ayn Rand). Peikoff is working on a new book about "DIM," or Disintegration, Integration, and Misintegration. Peikoff argues that Objectivism promotes the proper integration of the facts of reality. An example of disintegration is skepticism; the most common form of "misintegration" -- or system building apart from reality -- is religion. As an application of his work, Peikoff has argued that, today, religion is the larger threat. The question asks whether one must accept Peikoff's theory of DIM in order to be an Objectivist; Peikoff answers no.

The second question concerns the significance of political parties. Peikoff argues that, in today's mixed economy in which parties are affiliated with pressure groups, parties are "very influential." The problem that Peikoff finds with today's Republican party is that it has been promoting "medieval Christian fundamentalism." Peikoff further argues that, today, the main conflict is not the individual versus the collective, but rather reason versus religion.

For the third question, regarding Ron Paul (a Republican presidential candidate), Peikoff asked Yaron Brook for his view. Brook replied that Paul's foreign policy is essentially libertarian in that it blames America for Islamic attacks. Paul also wants to return abortion to the states rather than ensure its legality. For these reasons, Paul strikes out with Peikoff. (I agree with the analysis of Brook and Peikoff.)

Should the United States government rescue slaves who aren't American citizens? Peikoff replies that, while the U.S. government must rescue its citizens from slavery, it shouldn't try to save non-citizens. After all, the government is funded by its citizens in order to protect the rights of its citizens. However, a voluntary charity to help other slaves is fine. Peikoff argues that the best way for the U.S. government to help spread freedom around the world is to establish genuine freedom here at home.

Finally, Peikoff discusses the moral status of accepting the unearned.

My review should be considered a summary only; my purpose is merely to alert readers to some of the issues covered by Peikoff in his podcasts (which are not searchable). Please don't take my word for it -- listen to Peikoff's podcast yourself.

Peikoff's Fourth Podcast

On December 11, Leonard Peikoff issued his fourth podcast, in which he answers questions about Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand.

Peikoff takes on four questions in that installment. First, what does Objectivism have to say about having and raising children? Peikoff briefly describes how parents can help their children develop physically, morally, and intellectually. Second, what is the moral status of labor unions, and, more generally, how should one function in a world with widespread government controls? Third, what is the relationship between the alleviation of pain and moral standards? Finally, are individual preferences in music subjective?

Those unfamiliar with the ideas of Rand and Peikoff will likely find the podcasts an accessible source for some basic applications of the philosophy.

Hsieh on Moral Responsibility

"I couldn't help it." We hear that a lot, but it's rarely true in those cases in which it's invoked.

Diana Hsieh (of NoodleFood) has placed her prospectus, "Moral Responsibility and Moral Luck," on her web page. (You can also read it in pieces through her blog starting with December 10.) The paper is basically a proposal for her doctoral dissertation, so it does not necessarily present her arguments in their final form.

Hsieh lays out the conditions under which a person should be held morally accountable for his or her actions. She also explains why various factors, such as most childhood experiences, do not absolve an adult of responsibility. If you're not as concerned with the academic debate, you might want to jump to page 22, "Moral Responsibility." In this section, Hsieh outlines the basic requirements for moral responsibility, drawing upon the theories of Aristotle.

Recovering from Rationalism

I am a recovering rationalist. I thought I was pretty smart, back in 1992 (it must have been), when I first got my copy of Leonard Peikoff's Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. I read it, understood it, and was even ready to start correcting it. Or so I thought. In fact, I did not understand Objectivism, at all. Or, rather, I understood only a few of its tenets, and those poorly. I was certainly not prepared to apply Objectivist principles consistently in my own life. My main problem was rationalism. I understood the philosophy as an interconnected system of ideas, but I did not understand how those ideas were related to the real world.

Take, for instance, my (lack of) understanding of "life" as the standard of value. I wrote thousands of words over the internet explaining the problems with that position. For example, how is one to choose between length of life and strength of life? I created long, rationalistic chains of arguments that (I thought) demonstrated the absurdities of holding "life" as the standard. Of course, what I was not doing is looking at what life really is. I was not drawing the principles from the facts; I was trying to derive principles from floating deductions.

Another example may be found in my interaction with libertarianism. Within a few years, I went from enthusiastically promoting libertarianism to denouncing libertarianism. In 2002, I was still defending libertarianism, though I was starting to pay more attention to certain of its problems. I made two basic arguments in defense of libertarianism. First, "If libertarianism is roughly wanting government only to protect property rights, then Objectivism is a type of libertarianism..." In other words, I was starting with (dubious) definitions and then proceeding deductively, rather than looking at the content of libertarianism. Second, I argued that the Objectivist case against libertarianism makes little sense, because Objectivists interact with others who are not principled. I was attempting a reductio ad absurdum, rather than looking at the relevant facts about libertarianism.

I revisited the issue in 2004. I was becoming much more aware of the problems within the libertarian movement, but I still tied myself to libertarianism using rationalistic arguments. I again tried to point out the internal contradictions of criticisms of libertarianism, to reduce those criticisms to absurdity. And I remained stuck on definitions as a starting point: "a single term can[not] be used to name only a single concept. ... [W]e frequently assign the same word to multiple concepts, and we rely upon context and explicit definitions to make clear our meaning." In short, I thought I could re-define libertarianism into respectability. A bit later I wrote of "two libertarianisms" and declared that, by the correct "definition, I am a libertarian, I have been a libertarian for many years, and I anticipate I will always be a libertarian."

By 2005, I was deeply alarmed by goings on in the libertarian movement, and I was beginning to look at what libertarianism is, rather than attempt to reconstruct it according to my prior definition. A month later, I declared, "I am not a libertarian." I summarized my reasons: "For I do not want to be lumped together with the pragmatists, reactionaries, tribalists, nihilists, hedonists, rationalists, subjectivists, idealists (of the Platonic variety), propagandists, utopians, and kooks of the libertarian movement." This was a big development for me. I had finally beat my head against enough concrete problems to begin to abandon my rationalistic view of libertarianism. However, I did not at that point explicitly understand that what I was starting to do is replace rationalism with an inductive approach. I continue to struggle with overcoming rationalism.

Unfortunately, the best Objectivist material about using induction to learn philosophy is not easy to access. A lecture by Darryl Wright helped me to understand the ethical significance of "life." (Unfortunately, I cannot at this point recall the title of that lecture.) Far and away the most helpful material for me has been Leonard Peikoff's "Understanding Objectivism" lectures. This outstanding material explicitly deals with the problems of rationalism. It is quite expensive; those who have a problem with the cost might consider finding a loaner copy or buying a copy to share. I've started Peikoff's "Objectivism Through Induction," which so far is also quite good. He discusses how to inductively approach issues such as causality, reason as man's means of survival, egoism, and other critical topics.

I am thrilled that Peikoff is making available on his web page a podcast in which he answers questions. He has not so far dealt explicitly with the topic of rationalism versus induction in philosophy, but his answers explode the rationalistic premises of various questions. For example, in his new podcast, he explains why the possibility of human instincts cannot be derived from evolutionary history. Instead, he suggests, we should look to see whether people in fact have instincts. So those trying to overcome rationalistic tendencies can listen to Peikoff's answers at the level of how they treat rationalism versus induction.